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
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ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY

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# RUSSIA'S WARNINGS

COLLECTED FROM OFFICIAL PAPERS

BY

HUBERT E. H. JERNINGHAM, M.P.

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Prof. A. C. Coolidge.

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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE subjoined Memorandum has been drawn up from such official papers on Central Asia as have at different times been presented to Parliament.

The accompanying letter from the Editor of *The Fortnightly Review* will show that if the Memorandum has somewhat outgrown the limits of an ordinary article, it is mainly due to his encouragement that I venture to offer it to the public in its present form.

No words but the utterances of responsible persons having been used, facts speak for themselves, and require no comments in these pages.

It may, however, be noticed on the part of Russia that, excepting on the single point of

the independence of Afghanistan, no Russian promises to England were ever unqualified ; that in the development of a long and well-conceived policy of aggrandisement, Russian statesmen always cleverly hinted at the directions which their gradual advance would next take ; that the causes of possible future disputes with neighbouring tribes entailing redress were never altogether kept back ; and that the frontier over which we are now quarrelling was studiously ignored from the agreement come to before the capture of Khiva in 1873.

On the other hand, it will be observed that, bearing in mind our own progressive conquest of India, Her Majesty's Government, to whichever political party they belonged, ever treated Russian advances as facts which it was too late to notice, and continued to place honourable faith in promises which perhaps they were too ready to look upon as absolute, or

maybe to which they were loath to ascribe the conditional character they possessed.

Lastly, it must be acknowledged that, come what may, the perusal of the official papers presented to Parliament by the responsible Executive, forces the conviction that the limits of patience, of concession, nay, even of diplomatic faith, have been reached, and that the time has arrived when proper delimitations of frontiers should be fixed, such as will preclude all encroachments of territory in the future, whether on one side or the other, for such flimsy motives as have hitherto been alleged, and condoned.

HUBERT E. H. JERNINGHAM.

DEAR MR. JERNINGHAM,

I am exceedingly glad that you have given effect to the idea which some little time since you suggested to me, and which, as you will remember, I warmly approved, of bringing together in a compendious shape all that is most essential to the present Anglo-Russian dispute in Central Asia, contained in the official despatches which you have mastered with such thoroughness.

I am obliged to you for allowing me to see the proofs, and I congratulate you on the success with which you have accomplished a task of great service and considerable difficulty. You would, in my opinion, be wrong in withholding from the public the results of your labours, and I am pleased to hear that you have decided on printing them.

Yours sincerely,

T. H. S. ESCOTT.

THE MEMORANDUM IS DRAWN FROM  
THE FOLLOWING PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

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Central Asia, No. 2, 1873 ... March 27, 1869 to Feb. 14, 1873  
(inclusive of Russian Mémo-  
randum of 1864)

Central Asia 1873 ... Oct. 17, 1872 to Jan. 19, 1873

„ „ No. 2, 1874 ... Dec. 20, 1873 to Jan. 4, 1874

„ „ No. 1, 1878 ... Dec. 20, 1873 to Sept. 30, 1878

Appendix 1, 1865

„ 2, 1870-3

Turkey, No. 39, 1878 ... Protocols of Berlin Conference

„ No. 44, 1878 ... Treaty of Berlin

Central Asia, No. 2, 1878 ... Sept. 30, 1878 to Nov. 28, 1878

„ „ No. 1, 1879 ... Dec. 4, 1871 to Jan. 15, 1879

Central Asia and Quetta,

1879 ... .. Return : Despatches of 1867

Central Asia, No. 1, 1880 ... Dec. 31, 1878 to Dec. 16, 1879

Turkey, No. 10, 1881 ... Demarcation of Russo-Turkish  
frontier

Central Asia, No. 4, 1881 ... March 28, 1881 to Oct. 31, 1881

„ „ No. 1, 1882 ... Sept. 28, 1881 to Jan. 23, 1882

„ „ No. 1, 1884 ... Dec. 30, 1881 to Feb. 15, 1884



MEMORANDUM  
ON THE PROGRESS OF RUSSIA  
IN CENTRAL ASIA.

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RELYING on the principles which he sets forth, that "Asiatics have no respect for anything but palpable and visible force," and that "retreat in their eyes is always set down to weakness," Prince Gortchakow, in a circular despatch, explains that the neighbourhood of half-civilised tribes has obliged Russia, at various times, first to chastise, next to repress, then to protect, and finally not to retreat.

Prince Gortchakow to Russian Representatives,  
21 Nov. 1864.

This course obliged Russia to settle first on the Syr Daria, then on the lake Issyk-Kaul, and next in "advanced forts" between those points.

This line of frontier being, however, on the limit of the desert, Russia, notwithstand-

ing her "repugnance" to its extension, was compelled to take possession of Tchemkend, in order to consolidate what she already possessed.

"Being thus face to face with the better civilised and trading populations of Khokand, Russia has reached the limits. Here interest and reason command her stopping any forward movement; not only because such movements would bring her in contact with more regularly constituted States, which it would require greater efforts to subdue, and might entail a series of annexations, but because she hopes that, notwithstanding the instability of their political condition, she may establish regular relations with them which shall be for the advantage of all."

Circular despatch, 21 Nov. 1864.

*Ibid.*

Notwithstanding that "interest and reason commanded a pause," Samarkand was annexed in 1868, and in 1869 Lord Clarendon proposed to Baron Brünnow "the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which

should be the limit of those possessions, and be scrupulously respected by both Powers," whereupon Prince Gortchakow "gave a positive assurance that Afghanistan would be considered as entirely beyond the sphere in which Russia might be called to exercise her influence"; and in conversation with Mr. Rumbold said: "that Lord Clarendon, having first suggested Afghanistan as the territory which should be considered neutral, he had adopted the suggestion."

Lord Clarendon  
to Sir A. Buchanan,  
27 March  
1869.

Prince Gortchakow  
to Baron Brünnow,  
7 March 1869.

Mr. Rumbold  
Lord Clarendon,  
6 April 1869.

Mr. Rumbold remarked that Lord Clarendon "was not yet sufficiently informed as to whether Afghanistan would fulfil all the conditions required": and on the advice of the Indian Council, Lord Clarendon wrote "that the Indian Government would not hear of Afghanistan, and proposed the Upper Oxus, south of Bokhara, as a boundary line, which neither Power should permit their forces to cross." But Baron Brünnow observed that "Khiva was south of the Oxus, and that the Khivan territory might become obnoxious to

*Ibid.*

Lord Clarendon  
to Mr. Rumbold,  
17 April.

Russia if made neutral"; a remark which was given force to by Prince Gortchakow, who merely maintained that "Khivan territory south of the Oxus was Bokharian."

Mr. Rumbold to  
Lord Clarendon,  
2 June 1869.

By way of confirming this view, the Emperor informed Sir A. Buchanan that "he had no ambitious views, and trusted no complications would arise, though an irruption of Khivans into the Government of Orenburg had recently taken place, and such incidents could not be permitted."

Sir A. Buchanan  
to Lord Clarendon,  
26 July  
1869.

In September, however, Prince Gortchakow being at Baden, and Lord Clarendon at Wiesbaden, an interview between the two Ministers was arranged at Heidelberg, when the Prince assured Lord Clarendon "that he entirely shared his Emperor's opinion that extension of territory was extension of weakness": that "he could give no better proof of His Majesty's determination not to proceed southwards," than to state that "it was the Emperor's intention not to retain Samarkand," though "it was true that Bokhara

might be taken at any moment, as it depended on Samarkand for its supply of water," and "expressing a hope that Lord Clarendon would not press the line of the Oxus, as a portion of the country south of the Oxus was claimed by the Emir of Bokhara."

Lord Clarendon  
to Sir A. Buchanan,  
Sept. 3,  
1869.

In November, however, the principle of the despatch of 1864 had reasserted itself, and Sir Andrew wrote that while the "Krasnovodsk establishment was to be a mere factory, protected by a small force against the Khan of Khiva," it appeared that, "with respect to Samarkand, there was some difficulty in ascertaining how it could be restored to Bokhara without loss of dignity," and though a month later Prince Gortchakow "denied positively the existence of any intention on the part of the Russian Government to despatch a military expedition to Khiva," adding that he would never "consent to an extension of the territory of the Empire," the Prince, on being reminded of his pacific utterance, explained that "his

Sir A. Buchanan  
to Lord Clarendon,  
Nov. 1.

*Ibid.*, Nov. 2.

*Ibid.*, Dec. 1.

statement could only mean that he himself would disapprove of it, as he could not prevent it were the Emperor to decide in its favour."

Sir A. Buchanan  
to Lord Clarendon,  
Dec. 29.

He consoled the Ambassador, however, by assuring him that "though he might withhold information from him, he might rely on what he did tell him being true," and requesting him at the same time "not to ask him information officially."

*Ibid.*

Prince Gortchakow shortly afterwards assured Sir Andrew that the policy of Russia was the same as that of India, viz., to create, on the frontiers of the Empire, "a series of influential but not tributary or neutralised States, to secure to them national independence, and to put an end to that state of conflict and internal disturbance which had for ages prevailed in those regions."

*Ibid.*, Feb. 8,  
1870.

Lord Clarendon  
to Sir A. Buchanan,  
Feb. 16.

This policy was warmly commended by the English Government, but on the British Ambassador truly observing that "a communication to Her Majesty's Government as to

the steps taken by the Russian Government to restrain the Khan of Bokhara from acts of aggression against Shere Ali would greatly strengthen the Viceroy of India in the influence he exercised over Shere Ali," the Prince considered that his sincerity was being "questioned," which, indeed, it might well be, for at that moment, on the pretext of the Emir of Bokhara not interfering with Shere Ali's States, Kolab, which belonged to him, was annexed by Russia. Krasnovodsk was also occupied, "but this," said the Emperor of Russia, "was hardly a conquest, as the territory had been almost without a sovereign"; *Ibid.* Prince Gortchakow remarking, however, a month later, that the Khan of Khiva, "dissatisfied with the occupation of Krasnovodsk by Russia, would probably show his dissatisfaction by some covert act of hostility, in which case he would be punished"; but *Ibid.*, April 8, 1870. "that the most positive assurances had been given to Persia that the frontier of the Attrek *Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1870. would be respected." General Miliutine, the

Sir A. Buchanan,  
Feb. 21, 1870.

Sir A. Buchanan  
to Lord Claren-  
on, March 8.

War Minister, "apprehended that the Khan of Khiva, untaught by the lesson of the Kirghize insurrection, was exposing himself to the danger of a Russian war," and was informed that "General Kauffmann was far from being satisfied with his relations with the Khan of Bokhara," while at the same time he "regretted that a rumour was abroad to the effect that Shere Ali was about to construct a fort on the Oxus in the district of Andkhoi."

*Ibid.*, March 22.

On Sir Andrew remarking that Andkhoi had been "an Afghan province ever since 1850," the General, without disputing the possibility of the fact being such, thought "the fort might be a cause of jealousy with Bokhara."

While these hints of aggression from every point of the compass were being conveyed to Sir Andrew, the Russian Government was directly informed that Afghanistan recognised its frontier to extend no further in Badakshan than Maimena, with the exceptions of

Kerkee and Chargui, which are not dependent on Cabul," and in return the Russian Government informed Sir Andrew that "Abdul Rahman, who has arrived at Samarkand, and will not fail to proceed to Tashkend," had offered to use his influence in Afghanistan in favour of Russia, but that General Kauffmann had rejected these offers, though he had received him at Tashkend with honour and cordiality from feelings of hospitality toward the unfortunate, but not as supporting him as a rival to the Ameer Shere Ali."

Sir A. Buchanan  
to Prince Gort-  
chakow, 17  
March 1870.

*Ibid.*, 25 April.

*Ibid.*, 15 June.

In May, Lord Mayo sent the limits of Afghanistan as the Indian Government understood them. They are those of Dost Mahomed's kingdom.

"Oxus, the recognised boundary between Bokhara and Afghanistan, from Balkh to the extreme end of Badakshan, including Khulm, Maimena, Andkhoi, Shibargan, and Siripool.

"North-west boundary runs from a point on the Oxus between Khoja Saleh and Kerki,

including Maimena and Herat, with the dependence between the Mhurgab and Herirood.

“North, the Oxus from same point to Punjab and Dakhan, and thence to the Pamir Steppe.”

*Inclosure in  
Lord Granville  
to Sir A. Buch-  
anan, May 20,  
1870.*

*S. A. Buchanan  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, Aug. 18.*

While pressing these limits on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, Sir Andrew was instructed to say that “if Khoja Saleh were admitted to be within the territories of the Ameer of Cabul, Her Majesty's Government would not object to a definition of the frontier by which the rights of Bokhara should be determined to commence at a point on the left bank of the Oxus, immediately below that place.” A month later Sir Andrew was informed “that the opinions of the Government of India” had been sent to General Kauffmann, “whose acceptance of them as correct would be equivalent to an engagement that their definition of the frontier would be respected,” and “that with reference to Khoja Saleh, no objection would, perhaps, be made to include it within the Afghan frontier, but that great care would be required in

*Ibid.*

tracing a line from thence south, as Merv was becoming commercially important."

Sir A. Buchanan  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, Sept. 21,  
1870.

N.B.—Merv is north of any line drawn south of Khoja Saleh.

In June 1871, Lord Granville asked for a reply to his despatch about the Afghan frontier of May 1870, and in November 1871, Prince Gortchakow instructed Count Brünnow to "protest against the rights of Shere Ali being those of Dost Mohamed in the delimitation of the Afghan territory."

Prince Gortcha-  
kow to Count  
Brünnow, 1-13  
Nov. 1871, com-  
municated to  
Lord Granville  
Dec. 13.

In October 1872, General Kauffmann's report not having been received, Lord Granville informed Lord A. Loftus "that Her Majesty's Government could not wait any longer," and laid down the principle "that in their opinion the right of the Ameer of Cabul to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus as far down as Khoja Saleh, is fully established, and they believe, and have so stated to him through the Indian Government, that he would have a right to defend these territories if invaded."

Lord Granville informed Lord A. Loftus, besides, what territories and boundaries Her Majesty's Government considered as fully belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, viz. :—

1. Badakshan and Dakhan, from Sarikal to junction of the Kokcha and Oxus (Penjah), northern boundary.
2. Afghan Turkestan, Kunduz, Khulm, Balkh, from Penjah, to Khoja Saleh.
3. Internal district of Aksha, Siripool, Maimena, Shibbergan, and Andkhoi.
4. Western Afghan, between dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian province of Khorassan, "this frontier being well known, and not in need of being defined."

Lord Granville  
to Lord A.  
Loftus, 17 Oct.  
1872.

To this despatch, in December, Prince Gortchakow replied, through Count Brünnow, that from General Kauffmann's report, received in October, "it would seem that No. 2, the frontier from Penjah to Khoja Saleh is not to be objected to; that as to No. 1, Badakshan and Dakhan are independent States, and

not provinces of Afghanistan; and that No. 3, though doubtful, would not be opposed," while not a word was said about No. 4.\*

Prince Gortchakow to Count Brünnow, 7 Dec 1872.

Count Schouvaloff, in 1873, confirmed the Emperor's decision not to let boundary points be a bar to the good relations between England and Russia, and at the same time informed Lord Granville that an expedition against Khiva would set out in 1874, "but it was far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of it." It was very desirable, therefore, to come to an early decision on the boundary question; and Lord Granville having insisted on Badakshan and Dakhan being Afghan provinces, Prince Gortchakow informed Count Brünnow that "*vu le plus de facilité qu'a le Gouvernement Britannique de recueillir des données précises, et surtout vu le désir de ne point donner à cette question de détail plus d'importance qu'elle ne comporte, nous ne refusons pas d'admettre la ligne de démarcation anglaise.*"

Lord Granville to Lord A. Loftus, 8 Jan. 1873.

*Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1873.

\* The frontier now in dispute.

This concession to English views, which had never been, nor could ever have been, seriously opposed, was followed by the taking of Khiva, and the publication of the treaty of peace with the Khan, Article III of which declared "the whole of the right bank of the Amu Daria and the lands adjoining thereunto, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the Khan into the possession of Russia."

Mr. Doria to  
Lord Granville,  
Dec. 20, 1873.

No wonder that Her Majesty's Government "saw no practical advantage in examining too minutely how far these Treaty arrangements were in strict accordance with the assurances given to Lord Granville in January 1873 by Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which the expedition against Khiva was undertaken," and that in view of the Ameer of Cabul's "apprehensions that the result of a Russian expedition against Merv will be to drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the province of Badghees in Herat," they "thought it right to state candidly, and at once, that the

independence of Afghanistan is regarded by them as matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia."

Lord Granville  
to Lord A.  
Loftus, Jan. 7,  
1874.

Prince Gortchakow merely replied by "re-iterating to Lord A. Loftus the positive assurance that the Imperial Cabinet persisted in considering Afghanistan as entirely without its sphere of action," and gave another promise that the Imperial Government "had no intention of organising an expedition against the Turkomans," though, "if these turbulent tribes were to indulge in acts of aggression or of brigandage, it would be the duty of Russia to punish them."

Prince Gortcha-  
kow to Count  
Brünnow, Jan.  
21, 1874.

The Emperor of Russia held exactly the same language to Lord A. Loftus, and Prince Gortchakow further added to the Ambassador that, "happen what might, the Imperial Government would never interfere in the internal state of Afghanistan," while at the same time he announced that "a scientific mission was intended to explore and survey

Lord A. Loftus  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, Jan. 19,  
1874.

*Ibid.*, Jan. 28,  
1874.

the course of the Lower Oxus," and "it had been suggested to him that it should extend its researches to the Upper Oxus as far as Sirikul, the boundary of Afghanistan." That Imperial orders could be enforced is shown in a letter of Prince Gortchakow, who, in order to ensure "no cloud on the political horizon during the Emperor's visit to England," informed Count Brünnow that "orders of the Emperor that no expeditions should be undertaken against the Teké Turkomans, which means in the direction of Merv, have been given in such peremptory terms that no local ambition will dare to take the liberty of transgressing them."

Prince Gortchakow to Count Brünnow, 24 March 1874.

But a Russian soldier who was missing was willingly supposed to be imprisoned at Merv, and to rescue him the chiefs of the tribes between the Attrek and the Goorgan were invited to "meet" General Llamakin at "Ashurade on the Caspian," and swear friendship to Russia, guaranteeing their oath "by the promise of an attack on the Merv Turkomans," while

Lord Loftus to Lord Derby, 24 June 1874.

Inclosure in above.

the General himself addressed a circular "to the whole of the Turkoman chiefs occupying the line of country lying between the Caspian Sea, Merv, and the Oxus at Charjui," advising them "that the orders of the sovereign of the world should be carried out," and that they should again meet him at Krasnovodsk, as he had been appointed "to the supreme authority on the Attrek and the Goorgan" by the Emperor of Russia; which meant that "this unquestionable Persian territory" had been annexed to Russia. M. de Westmann, acting for Prince Gortchakow, explained that "the whole circumstance had been misrepresented"; that another country's possessions had been annexed, "through incorrect translations from the original Tartar text of the Circular," and that the matter had been arranged between Persia and Russia, but "he could not comprehend in what way the incident referred to could affect Great Britain."

Mr. T. Thomson  
to Lord Derby,  
May 28.

Inclosed  
above.

Lord A. Loftus  
to Lord Derby,  
Nov. 17, 1874.

In March 1875, Lord Derby, "who of late had been reluctant to seem to indicate distrust,

by unnecessarily requesting explanations as to the Russian Government's proceedings in Central Asia," expressed to Count Schouvaloff his opinion that "the only case in which he conceived an advance of British troops westward as probable, was in the event of any Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merv," reminding him of "the great importance which the Indian Government attached to Merv." This elicited another Imperial assurance that the Emperor "has no intention of extending the frontiers of Russia such as they exist at present in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on that of Krasnovodsk and of the Attrek," and an elaborate Russian memorandum as to past events, showing that having undertaken some years back "to establish order and tranquillity in the Kirgheez steppes," Russia could "only stop her frontiers at that place where fixed populations began and presented elements of a stable social organisation."

Lord Derby to  
Lord A. Loftus,  
March 19, 1875.

Prince Gortcha-  
kow to Count  
Schouvaloff,  
April 5, May 11.

For that purpose the line of frontier from

Tchemkend to Issik Kul had first been resolved upon, but the difficulty of dealing with "semi-savage populations" obliged Russia to proceed to Tashkend, where she was "in presence of the army of the Emir of Bokhara": this could not be allowed, and "Samarkand was compelled to surrender." Difficulties having then arisen as to the views of Russia and England with regard to the provinces of Vakhan and Badakshan being Afghan, Russia gave way, and "sur ces entrefaites l'expédition de Khiva fut décidée": then, in order to "preserve the autonomy of Khiva," Russia was obliged "to annex to her possessions the arid desert which stretches from that place to the newly constructed fort on the right bank of the Oxus"; and finally, that it having been recognised by both countries "that in the present state of things the Russian and English frontiers in Central Asia could not be considered definite, an international arrangement with regard to this point would be fruitless," while particular stress was laid

Memo. inclosed  
in above  
despatch.

on the agreement with Mr. Forsyth, that, 1, it was desirable to have an intermediary neutral zone between the two frontiers of England and Russia in Central Asia, and, 2, that Afghanistan should be that zone.

Lord Salisbury remarked upon this memorandum that the neutral zone of Afghanistan proposed by Lord Clarendon, and jumped at by Prince Gortchakow, dropped when India refused to admit it, and was never revived by Mr. Forsyth, and that the line of the boundary proposed by Lord Granville in 1872 "can never be looked upon by the English Cabinet otherwise than as a recognition of a fact which had never really admitted of question," and suggested that Lord Derby should "intimate the inability of Her Majesty's Government to accept the version now put forward of the negotiations of late years."

Lord G. Hamilton to Lord Tenterden, June 22, 1871.

To Mr. Doria, Baron Jomini was more explicit. "If Russia," he said, "lived at peace with her frontier reaching to Austria and Germany, why should the fact of her territory

touching the borders of the British Empire in India be a reason for warfare?" and "as to the neutral zone which had been talked of, it is an impossibility in a territory of barbarians"; but, added Mr. Doria, "the main points in His Excellency's conversation went to show the fixed idea existing in his mind that the British and Russian Empires must eventually become coterminous."

Mr. Doria to  
Lord Derby,  
June 23.

*Ibid.*, July 13.

A month later the language was still more categorical. Speaking "without reluctance or hesitation, Baron Jomini stated that there was no cause for, or advantage to be gained by, an expedition to Merv. If there was, then, although they would be very sorry to be disagreeable to England, 'everyone for himself, and God for all'; but if they took Merv, they would find themselves, on account of the marauding tribes, necessitated to make a further advance in order to curb and restrain them, and where was it to end?"

*Ibid.*, Aug. 3.

While Lord Derby, at the suggestion of Lord Salisbury, was informing the Russian

Government that "steps had been taken to obtain the release of the solitary captive Russian soldier at Merv," General Kauffmann was invading Khokand for no other apparent reason than that "Dieu sera toujours contre ceux qui prennent les armes contre les Russes"; but when the British offer was made to Russia, the one prisoner turned out to be "several," and Baron Jomini talked of "Russia having ceded her pretensions to Maimena in behalf of the Ameer of Afghanistan at England's instance." Lord Derby's memorandum followed, and in this the grounds of English apprehensions were given, but not a word of warning appeared.

Mr. Doria to  
Lord Derby,  
Sept. 18.

*Ibid.*, Sept. 27.

In Lord  
Derby's to Mr.  
Doria, Oct. 25.

No wonder that Baron Jomini expressed delight "that all points which might give rise to sterile discussion had been omitted in the memorandum of Lord Derby," and that the Emperor called this "les largeurs de vue de Lord Derby," while Prince Gortchakow obtained his object, and was able to declare

Prince Gortcha-  
kow, Count  
Schouvaloff, 3, 1  
Feb. 1876.

that "while maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relating to the intermediate zone"; so as to clear the way for Russian advance up to the Afghan frontier.

Prince Gortchakow to General Schouvaloff, 3, 15 Feb. 1876.

In March the Khanate of Khokand was annexed, under the title of the Province of Ferghanah, and Mr. Disraeli declared in the House of Commons that he did "not see why Russia should not conquer Tartary as England had India"; an expression which was hailed with "enthusiasm in the Russian press." Meanwhile, General Kauffmann so constantly communicated with the Ameer of Cabul through Russian agents, that Lord Lytton expressed "a decided opinion on the necessity of remonstrating with Russia on the subject"; but though the General's agents and communications were known and given, Prince Gortchakow instructed Count Schou-

Lord A. Loftus to Lord Derby, March 27, 1876.

Inclosure in Lord A. Loftus's to Lord Derby, May 12, 1876.

Viceroy to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 16, 1876.  
Colonel Sir F. Pollock to Mr. Thornton, June 19, 1876.

Lord Derby to  
Lord A. Loftus,  
Oct. 12, 1875.

valoff "to deny categorically that Kauffmann was acting at Cabul either through agent or otherwise," not having probably quite forgotten that on the 2nd November 1869, "he had agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian agents should not visit Cabul."

Lord Lytton to  
Lord Salisbury,  
Sept. 18, 1876.

Notwithstanding categorical denials, however, M. de Giers acknowledged in November that "the agent was simply charged to deliver a letter of courtesy from General Kauffmann to the Ameer, which was the usual custom of the Governor-General of a neighbouring State"—a fact questioned by Lord A. Loftus, who said "that the Khanate of Bokhara was still to be regarded as an independent State."

Lord A. Loftus  
to Lord Derby,  
Nov. 17, 1876.

*Ibid.*, June 4,  
1877.

But to hurry matters, the Turcomans were appealed to, to help the Russians against the Teké tribes; Kizil Arvat was taken, and General Llamakin having pushed on in the direction of Merv, Lord Derby informed the Russian Government that "such an undertaking would impose upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance."

Lord Derby to  
Lord A. Loftus,  
June 13, 1877.

M. de Giers assured Lord Derby, through Count Schouvaloff, that he need have no fears, as "the military expedition against Kizil Arvat is only such as the troops of the Caucasus undertake every year for the maintenance of tranquillity on the frontier."

Inclosure in Lord  
A. Loftus's to  
Lord Derby,  
Oct. 23, 1877.

In 1878 the official press of St. Petersburg set forth that as "Persia and Russia were equally interested in subduing the Turcomans, this could only be effected by a Russian occupation of Merv"; and "to produce a counterpoise against the growing influence of England in Beloochistan, it was necessary that Russia should occupy Herat," and that "both measures could be more successfully carried out by marching on these two points through Persia."

Inclosure in Lord  
A. Loftus's to  
Lord Salisbury,  
June 5, 1878.

Rumours of war with Russia on account of Turkey died away, and a conciliatory despatch of Lord Salisbury only brought about an explanation, "that in view of a possible war, General Kauffmann had acted in accordance with the course imposed upon

Lord Salisbury  
to Mr. Plunkett,  
Aug. 19.

him by the force of circumstances ; but that the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan had now recovered their validity."

Lord Salisbury  
to Mr. Plunkett,  
Sept. 30.

In November, however, the Russian "mission of courtesy" to the Ameer of Cabul took place, and when the Russian Envoy left Cabul, the Russian Mission remained there.

Lord Salisbury's remark to Count Schouvaloff on the subject was answered by the admission that "the course followed by the Russian Government was abnormal."

Count Schouvaloff then insisted that "England had engaged to respect the independence of Afghanistan,"—a peculiar mode of putting the question, which, however, Lord Salisbury refused to admit; but he subsequently informed the Russian Ambassador that "when the Russian Mission is withdrawn from Cabul, Her Majesty's Government will consider that all engagements on both sides with respect to Afghanistan and Central Asia will retain

Lord Salisbury  
to Lord A.  
Leftus, Dec. 13,  
1878.

their obligatory characters"; which was looked upon as an acknowledgment of all the conquests of Russia till that date.

Lord Salisbury  
to Lord A.  
Loftus, Dec.  
1878.

In June 1878, Lord Salisbury informed Lord Odo Russell that he had been appointed with himself and Lord Beaconsfield a Plenipotentiary at the coming Congress of Berlin, where "the proposed annexations in Asia which have an injurious bearing upon the interests of Great Britain are not likely to excite any serious opposition on the part of the other European Powers," and where "there is no ground for believing that Russia will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardahan," but where he was not "on that account to abstain from earnestly pressing upon the Powers and upon Russia the justice of abstaining from annexations unconnected with the professed object of the war."\*

Lord Salisbury  
to Lord Odo  
Russell, June 8,  
1878. Turkey  
(No. 39), 1878.

Batoum, which Count Schouvaloff declared in the Congress was "necessary to Russia for the purpose of securing her communica-

\* Late war with Turkey.

Protocols of Conference, p. 210.  
Turkey (No. 39),  
1878.

tions with the large territory which Russia already possesses on that portion of the coast of the Black Sea," was declared by Article LIV of the Treaty of Berlin "a free and essentially commercial port," and Article LVIII "ceded to the Russian Empire in Asia the territories of Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum."

Treaty of Settlement of Affairs in the East, 13 July 1870.  
Turkey (No. 44),  
1878.

Article LX obliged the Porte to "cede to Persia the town and territory of Khotour, as fixed by the mixed Anglo-Russian Commission," although from the Protocols of the Berlin Conference some doubt as to the necessity of this step on the part of Powers not interested in Persia's friendship was expressed by Prince Bismarck, who wished to know from Malcolm Khan whether, "if this cession were decided on, it would be accepted by the Shah"; and the political significance of the cession as strengthening the ties between Russia and Persia was evinced in the declaration of Count Schouvaloff, that "Russia gives up Bayajid and all the valley

Protocols, pp. 215-16. Turkey (No. 39), 1878.

of Alachkerd under the reservation that Turkey will return the territory of Khotour to Persia."

Protocols,  
p. 209. Turkey  
(No. 39), 1878.

Meanwhile, the proceedings of Russian agents at Cabul, and the unsatisfactory relations between the Government of India and the Emir of Afghanistan, were seriously occupying the thoughts of Her Majesty's Government; and the invasion of Afghanistan having been decided upon, the opinions of competent officers opposed to such movements were published, in obedience to an address of the House of Commons on the 20th February 1879.

Central Asia and  
Quetta. Return,  
25 Feb. 1879.

A report of Colonel, now Sir Peter, Lumsden with regard to the means of defending Afghanistan was published, in which he declared "that the only safe policy to be pursued is to maintain the neutrality of Afghanistan, to secure the natural strategic points of our line of defence, to strengthen her, to obtain for her oppressed subjects the benefits of a stronger administration," and then, "with

Afghanistan independent, and her capital, Cabul, secured and connected with our internal lines of communication, our right would be safe, while an aggressive Power could only attack our left," but here "the extreme nature of the climate of Scinde would prevent such an attack being made in the cold season."

"With our communications perfected, and our base on the sea, there is no reason why we should not be able to concentrate from 70,000 to 150,000 men on the line of the Indus, prepared to prevent the deployment of any columns from the passes in front."

P. S. Lumsden,  
Simla, 15 Sept.  
1867.

Colonel Norman thought no course so likely to "lose us our Indian Empire as our pushing forward our army into Central Asia."

H. D. Norman,  
Simla, 5 Oct.  
1867.

Sir W. Mansfield held that England, "being encamped in India as in a foreign country, the commonest prudence forbade to treat the foreign country as if it were England, for the purpose of invading another, and sustaining a great conflict with a third Power of great strength and prestige, at a long dis-

tance from its border," and concluded "that all the circumstances of India prescribed that that conflict, if come it must in future times, can alone be prosecuted to a successful conclusion by us on our side of the mountain barriers of India."

Sir W. Mansfield,  
Simla, 14 Oct.  
1867.

"Common sense," wrote Mr. Taylor, "must convince anyone that the military difficulties of a Russian advance on India are almost insuperable," and "can only bring serious and irretrievable disaster upon Russia herself."

Hon. G. N. Taylor,  
Simla, 19  
Oct. 1867.

And finally, all the members of the Bombay Government informed Lord Cranbourne "that they were unanimously opposed to the project of occupying Quetta, suggested by Colonel Sir H. Greene," while Sir Stafford Northcote agreed "the measure would be inexpedient, both on political and on military grounds."

Sir John Lawrence and others,  
23 Jan. 1867.  
Sir S. Northcote.

No. 15, Secret, 26  
Dec. 1867.

But, in the course of 1879, events set all these utterances at naught, and the current of Russian opinions is gathered from the numberless newspaper extracts, forwarded officially

from St. Petersburg, and published by order of Her Majesty's Government, to the detriment, it must be allowed, of more reliable information, which was not vouchsafed.

Thus, in January, the *Novoe Vremya* "looks upon the Russian occupation of Merv as necessary," for "while the Ferghanah region is valuable, owing to its natural wealth and dense population," "Merv will serve as an advanced post, from whence we may easily effect demonstrations against Western Afghanistan and menace India"; but in February the same paper, commenting on the death of Shere Ali, thinks "that the English will probably demand no more than the surrender of the passes and the right of maintaining a permanent Resident at Cabul. In all probability we will, in time, be able to strengthen our influence in that part, but there can be no idea of any expedition to India. It is only in presence of an alliance with Afghanistan that Russia can reckon on a successful issue of such an expedition."

In Lord A. Loftus's despatch to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 29, 1879.

In Lord Dufferin's despatch to Lord Salisbury, March 12, 1879.

In March the *Moscow Gazette* acknowledged "that now that Russia's accounts with Turkey are settled, it is time to confess that the Central Asian Question and the Eastern difficulties, though accidentally connected, possess for Russia important significations."

In Lord Dufferin's despatch,  
March 12, 1879.

But English successes in Afghanistan were producing their effect upon the Teké Turkomans, whose daring led them to attack not only Chat, but even Chikishlar; and Consul Churchill, at Rescht, was able on the 11th of March to telegraph that "it was quite true that 10,000 men under General Llamakin, and 20,000 men under General Lazareff, were preparing to march from Chikishlar and Krasnovodsk respectively, on Merv."

Consul Churchill  
to Mr. Thomson,  
March 11, 1879.

Lord Dufferin confirmed this report on the 30th of April, and the first of the engagements with the Teké Turkomans was reported by Mr. Plunkett in May.

Lord Dufferin to  
Lord Salisbury,  
April 30, 1879.

Mr. Plunkett to  
Lord Salisbury,  
May 17, 1879.

In June came the news that a steamer had successfully performed the journey "from Petro Alexandrovsk to Khardjui, 279 miles,

or 446 versts, in  $7\frac{1}{2}$  days; and from Khardjui to Khoja Saleh, which was unknown to its sailors, a distance of 173 miles, or 260 versts, in eight days, stopping at Budarlik, Narajins, and Karki"; and M. Bykoff, the surveyor of the upper course of the Oxus, stated in his report that "he had no ground for supposing that the steam vessel could not have proceeded at least over the whole of that part of the river which he had surveyed," viz., "to the river Vaksha, a distance of 1,000 miles, or 1,500 versts," and "that this great Central Asian river is fully adapted to the purposes of navigation."

In Mr. Plunkett's of June 4, 1879.

Meanwhile, the peace of Gundamak between England and Afghanistan having been concluded, the Russians at once acknowledged that "English supremacy was definitely established in Afghanistan," and that "the line of the Oxus had become the limit of their supremacy in the southern part of Central Asia," while "the so-called neutral zone between Russian and British possessions had become abolished."

St. Petersburg  
May 24  
Gazette, June 6,  
1879.

They had therefore to look elsewhere, and the line of the Attrek on the Persian frontier seemed to meet their views. The *Golos* very pointedly remarked that "the Persian Government, projecting a line of railway from Teheran to Rescht, rendered it very probable on the part of Russia that she would on the other hand construct a line of railway towards Persia, and thus the most direct and simple way towards Afghanistan and India would be found."

*Golos.* Extract  
in Mr. Plunkett's  
June 18.

Lord Salisbury was informed in July by Count Schouvaloff that "Merv did not lie upon the nearest road between the Caspian and Herat," which statement entirely depended on the starting point from the Caspian, Chikishlar, or Krasnovodsk; but while M. de Giers assured Lord Dufferin "in the most positive manner that there was no intention on the part of the Russian Government to go to Merv," Baron Jomini warned His Excellency "that though they did not intend to go to Merv, he was not to deceive himself, for

Lord Salisbury  
to Lord Duf-  
ferin, July 9.

the result of their present proceedings would be to furnish Russia with a base of operations against England hereafter, should England, by the occupation of Herat, threaten the Russian position in Central Asia."

Lord Dufferin  
to Lord Salis-  
bury, July 16,  
1879.

A few days later M. de Giers conveyed to Lord Dufferin the express "approval by His Majesty of the assurances he had given as to the non-advance of Russian troops on Merv," and said that Baron Jomini had been mistaken in supposing that "the contemplated operations would extend so far eastward" as 200 versts from Merv; while a fortnight later, the Emperor himself "was pleased to assure Lord Dufferin that there was no intention of the Russian troops advancing to Merv"; but on these assurances being conveyed by Mr. Stanhope to the House of Commons, M. de Giers explained to Lord Dufferin that "he had not meant to imply that under different circumstances, and in view of unforeseen contingencies, the occupation of Merv might not become necessary; that, in fact, the Russian

*Ibid.*, July 30.

*Ibid.*, Aug. 13.

Government had never intended, by a solemn pledge given for all time, to preclude themselves from ever going to Merv."

Lord Dufferin  
to Lord Salisbury,  
Aug. 26

The frontier line between England and Russia in Asia was again alluded to in an influential paper, which declared that "the excellent natural buffer of Afghanistan having disappeared, a natural line of demarcation must be looked for and found in Afghanistan itself, the range of the Hindoo Kush and the lower range of the Heri Rud being especially suggested."

*Herald* article in  
Mr. Plunkett's,  
Sept. 9.

Following as it did some inspired articles on the necessity of England and Russia agreeing to the partition of Asia, it gave the cue to the Russian press generally, which urged, after the Cabul massacres, "that the sooner the two countries became coterminous, the sooner will disappear one of those dreadful phantoms which constantly embitter the relations between England and Russia"; and inspired the *Golos* with the nature of the changes likely to take place in consequence

*Gazette de St.  
Petersbourg*, in  
Mr. Plunkett's,  
Sept. 10, 1879.

of Major Cavagnari's death: "should England take possession of Cabul and Candahar, then Herat should be ceded to Persia, and our frontier on the Attrek must be rectified so as to ensure a basis of operations in the direction of Merv."

*Golos. Extract in  
Mr. Plunkett's,  
Sept. 18.*

The "moment of England's embarrassment," added that paper in another issue, "may be the most propitious for a contest with England in Central Asia"; but "the Asiatic policy of Russia being based altogether on future considerations, if an advance into Central Asia must be effected, let it rather take the direction of Herat than that of the barren waste of the Turkoman steppe."

*Ibid., Sept. 24.*

This advice received a practical answer even before it was given, for on the 9th of September the sanguinary engagement of Geok Tepé had advanced the Russian lines 375 miles towards Herat from the Caspian at Beurma, and while the Russian press called the advance "an expedition for the purpose of pacifying the Turkoman steppe of Akhal

Teké, and for the defence of the commercial route between Krasnovodsk and Khiva," a telegram from General Llamakin declared "that for six hours the twelve Russian guns never ceased firing on the fortified enclosure of Denghil Tepé, where close on 20,000 individuals, women and children, nearly all the population of Teké, were assembled. The action of the artillery was terrible ; Turkoman prisoners declare that many thousands of their countrymen perished."

*Journal de St. Pétersbourg, in Mr. Plunkett's, Oct. 4.*

*Ibid.*

According to a Russian military authority, the Tekés "are divided into two sections, those of the Akhal, at the foot of the Kourendagh, and those of Merv, in the oasis of that name," and the Geok Tepé massacre having disposed of the Akhal Tekés, Russia was now in presence only of the Tekés of Merv, though the Geok Tepé encounter made Russia retreat for awhile, and devote her energies to the plans for constructing a line of railway from the Caspian to Kizil Arvat, a Central Asia line from Khiva to Merv, and the exploration of the Oxus."

*In Mr. Plunkett's of Oct. 17, 1879.*

*Ibid., Dec. 16, 1879.*

Indeed, the Geok Tepé affair had proved so disastrous, that General Skobelev was entrusted with the further prosecution of the task of "pacifying the Teké tribes," and in the spring of 1881, being in possession of Askabad, he received the submission of the tribes in the person of their chief. "Ovez Mourad Tykma Serdar has sworn to serve faithfully His Majesty the Emperor, and his arrival puts an end to the Akhal Teké expedition."

Lord Dufferin  
to Lord Granville,  
April 14,  
1881.

The Russian press, delighting in this result, somewhat incautiously expressed "a fervent hope that the Caucasian and trans-Caspian authorities will refrain for the future from *creating* those conditions, owing to which Russia, through the force of events, is from time to time involved in expeditions."

Mr. Gosselin to  
Lord Granville,  
April 20, 1881.

With the end of the expedition, however, coincided the beginning of negotiations with Persia as to the boundaries of that country on the borders of Khorassan; and while an Imperial ukase decreed in general terms "the

annexation to the Empire of the Turkoman Teké territory," the Russian Minister at Teheran insisted on the possession of Gavers, "as it lies on the direct line of march from Akhal to the Atek of Khelat and the Tejjen," it "being well known that the route along the Attrek to Herat and Candahar is the best, if not the sole one, in the event of an expedition against East India."

In Mr. Wyndham's, May 25, 1881.

Mr. Thomson to Lord Granville, April 5, 1881.

*Novoe Vremya* extract in Mr. Wyndham's, May 30, 1881.

When requested by Her Majesty's Government to "define the boundaries of the lately incorporated Teké country," M. de Giers "could not take any engagement beforehand as to making them known," remarking "that he was not aware that when the English annexed territories they were asked what their frontiers were," but adding, "that the moment was favourable for a rectification of the Russian and Persian frontiers," and that Askabad was the "most south-eastern town of the Teké oasis."

Lord Granville to Mr. Wyndham, June 13.

Mr. Wyndham to Lord Granville, June 22.

*Ibid.*, June 29.

In an article written, however, by General Annenkoff, the boundaries of the new Russian

province were given as commencing at Kizil Arvat to Bami, and extending thence by Askabad to Sarakhs.

Mr. Wyndham  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, July 20.

On Mr. Wyndham asking Baron Jomini whether the Teké oasis really extended to Sarakhs, His Excellency replied that "he believed the oasis extended as far as Askabad ; that there was only one town called Sarakhs, and that it was a disputed point as to whether it was a Persian town or not."

*Ibid.*

On being pressed upon the question of boundaries, Baron Jomini informed Mr. Wyndham "that their farthest point now was Askabad, but that General Scobeleff had discovered some very fertile country further south, where a complete state of disorder existed ; that there was Sarakhs also to be considered, and whether it was Persian or not remained to be verified ; but if it was not Persian, that it would be necessary to establish some form of government there as elsewhere."

*Ibid.*, July 27,  
1881

As to Merv, the press appeared to be

instructed to say that "the Russian Government has never entered into any engagements with respect to Merv"; that the annexation of or "Protectorate over Merv will be a matter only concerning Russia and the Turkomans, and will be announced to the world as a *fait accompli*"; and while one paper announced that "in view of the dangerous proximity of Merv, and in order to follow the movements of the Tekés, a large fort had been constructed at Askabad," another announced the "completion of the military trans-Caspian railway to Kizil Arvat."

*Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, in Mr. Wyndham's, Aug. 10, 1881.

*St. Petersburg Herald*, in Mr. Wyndham's, Aug. 10, 1881.

*Novoe Vremya*, in Mr. Wyndham's, Aug. 17, 1881.

*Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, in Mr. Wyndham's, Aug. 18, 1881.

Meanwhile, the question of Sarakhs caused anxiety in Persia, and Mr. Thomson, commenting on the doubts thrown out by Baron Jomini as to its being Persian or not, wrote that "there cannot be the slightest doubt that it belongs to Persia, as much as Khelat or Kuchan, or any other frontier town governed by Persian officials, and held by Persian troops.

"It has been built by them and has been

garrisoned by them for the last twenty-five years."

Mr. Thomson  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, Sept. 1,  
1881.

In December the line of frontier agreed upon between Persia and Russia was described as "following the course of the Attrek river from the Caspian to Chat, thence to Khojeh Kala on the Sombar river, thus placing Kari Kala in the possession of Russia, then carried along the hills, passing about twenty miles south of Geok Tepé and seven miles south of Askabad to Baba Dormuz, twenty miles east of Gavers."

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville.

"Then the frontier runs northwards, intersects the road leading from Gavers to Kuftabad, and then becomes lost in the sandy desert, leaving Attrek beyond Russian limits."

*Official Gazette*,  
in Sir E. Thorne-  
ton's, Feb. 7,  
1882.

This latter remark led the press to speculate at will as to the exact distance of Sarakhs from the frontier, the *Golos* alarming Lord Granville by stating that "the new Russian-Persian frontier is traced sixteen versts only short of Sarakhs"; but according to Persian authorities, "the Russian frontier is

Lord Granville  
to Mr. Thomson  
Feb. 11, 1882.

nearly one hundred and fifty miles short of Sarakhs," which M. Lessar, Government Engineer, informed the Russian Geographical Society in St. Petersburg, "was a large Persian fortress occupied by a battalion of infantry numbering about 700 men with six guns in very bad condition."

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
Feb. 13, 1882.

But as on the whole "the friendly relations between England and Russia had rarely, if ever, been on a better footing," Lord Granville suggested to Prince Lobanow that "some agreement might be come to as regards the policy and position of the two Powers in Asia which should remove the jealousy with which public opinion in England was inclined to view the success and progress of the Russian arms in those regions," and which "would materially contribute to the tranquillity and civilisation of the Asiatic States and populations," "seeing that the two Governments were acting harmoniously"; and he suggested that "an

In Sir E. Thornton's, Feb. 17,  
1882.

Lord Granville  
to Sir E. Thornton,  
Feb. 2, 1882.

*Ibid.*

land, Russia, and Persia for the settlement of the frontier now left undefined between Persia and the Turkoman country, from Baba Dormuz to the point where the Persian frontier meets that of Afghanistan, in the neighbourhood of the Heri Rud, and for its subsequent demarcation by English, Russian, and Persian officers."

Lord Granville  
to Sir E. Thornton,  
Feb. 2, 1882.

*Ibid.*

Prince Lobanow was of opinion that "if in the future it became necessary to define further the boundary between Russia and Persia, it was a matter to be settled between the two conterminous States"; but he was subsequently instructed that his Government "acknowledged the continued validity of the agreement formerly entered into by Prince Gortchakow (with Lord Clarendon), by which Afghanistan was admitted to be beyond the sphere of Russian influence," and that they were ready to come to "a settlement of the frontier of Afghanistan from the point where it had been left undefined (viz., Khoja Saleh) as far as Sarakhs."

*Ibid.*, Feb. 22,  
1882.

Lord Granville remonstrated that as "the desire of Her Majesty's Government was to make an arrangement which should prevent any occasion or opportunity for a further advance of Russia towards Afghanistan," it appeared to him that "if the possession of Sarakhs were at any time aimed at by Russia, it could not be for the purposes which have hitherto been stated by them as their object"; and at an interview, at which Lord Hartington was present, it was represented on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that "as Turkomans of Merv were now the only tribes from whom Russia could apprehend acts of aggression, and that these tribes could only reach the Russian frontier by one route, that which descends from Merv to Sarakhs, and then turns to the north-west, it seemed possible to prevent sudden incursions by an arrangement between Russia and England to determine the limits of Persia towards the Steppe"; but the Russian Ambassador replied that his Government was of his opinion,

Lord Granville  
to Sir E. Thorn-  
ton, March 14,  
1882.

that such a "matter concerned Russia and the Shah exclusively."

Lord Granville to  
Sir E. Thornton,  
March 22, 1882.

To this Lord Granville found no objection "if the agreement between them was in the sense of Lord Hartington's proposal," even though he could not admit that England had no interest "in the settlement of frontier questions regarding Persia."

*Ibid.*

On the 27th March, Lord Granville received word that "the Persian Government had decided to abstain from all interference with Merv and the Tejjen districts occupied by Teké Turkomans," and Mr. Thomson believed that "at no distant date the Turkomans of Merv will offer their submission to Russia, or place themselves under her protection"; and while he telegraphed "the advance of 140 Russians to Karibend on the Tejend river," M. de Giers requested Prince Lobanow to express "the Emperor's strong desire, and his own, to be on the best terms with England, and their anxiety to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government with

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
Feb. 13, 1882.

*Ibid.*, April 12,  
1882.

regard to Central Asia as much as possible"; and to Sir Edward Thornton he said that "Persia had no right whatever to the country from Sarakhs to Baba Dormuz," and that "His Imperial Majesty was very averse to making any engagements with another Power which the force of circumstances might hereafter render it impossible for the Russian authorities to keep."

Lord Granville to  
Sir E. Thornton  
April 22.

"The Russian Government," said M. de Giers, "have no particular objection to Candahar being occupied by British forces," but "with a view to prevent disturbances on the borders of Afghanistan, the boundary of that country, from Khoja Saleh to the Persian frontier near Sarakhs, should be formally and definitely laid down."

Sir E. Thornton  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, April 29,  
1882.

And as a criticism of the Imperial remarks came the announcement, received on July 25, that "on the 28th of October 1881, Colonel Grotekilm had concluded a convention with the Elders of Merv preparatory to their submission to Russia, though on the 18th of June

1881, M. de Giers and Baron Jomini had both declared to Mr. Wyndham that there was no question of negotiating a treaty with the Merv Turkomans."

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
July 25, 1882.

By way of confirming the peaceful assurances of the Russian authorities, General Tchernaiëff was "gazetted Governor-General of Turkestan," though a month before M. de Giers had informed our Ambassador "that he believed General Tchernaiëff would not receive that appointment": and M. Lessar explored the country "from Askabad to Herat," informing the world "that the best road from Sarakhs southward ran between the Murghab and the Heri Rud, and not through Persian territory," and "compared with other roads traversed by him, it was the best between Sarakhs and Khosan ('the first Afghan settlement on the banks of the Heri Rud'), and consequently between Askabad and Herat," while "the road from Merv to Herat by Ak Rabat and along the Kulik River to Djenevida and the Islim-Chilimé spring *avoids the Perepamisus range.*"

Sir E. Thornton  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, June 1,  
1882.

*Ibid.*, April 20,  
1882.

*Colas. Extracts in*  
Sir E. Thornton's,  
Oct. 26, 1882.

Early in January 1883, "some Merv raiders near Chacha, in Atek of Khelat, killed two Russians," and, "a body of Russian cavalry and infantry with two guns entered the Persian territory of Atek," while "the Russian authorities at Askabad demanded from the Khan of Merv the surrender of the guilty persons," a demand which was at once "complied with," though it would seem the Russians had not left Chacha in Persian territory on the 16th of February, since Mr. Condie Stephen, second Secretary to Her Majesty's Legation at Teheran, who was on an official mission through Khorassan, was "rudely stopped at Chacha by a Russian, who threatened to use force."

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
Jan. 1883.

*Novoe Vremya*.  
Extract in Sir E.  
Thornton's, Jan.  
17.

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
Feb. 6, 1883.

*Ibid.*, Feb. 19.

The matter was referred to St. Petersburg for explanations, when M. de Giers promised to see to it, though from no department had he received any information whatever relative to this incident, "but he would seize the opportunity to inform Her Majesty's Government" that the Imperial Cabinet "consi-

dered it quite impossible to admit that the Atek could be looked upon as an integral part of Persia."

Inclosure in Sir  
Ed. Thornton's to  
Lord Granville,  
Feb. 26.

On the 22nd February the Viceroy of India assured Ameer Abdul Rahman Khan that "many vague rumours are doubtless afloat, but they are for the most part without foundation, and need cause His Highness no uneasiness, more especially as under the engagements of 1880, should any foreign Power attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and should such interference lead to unprovoked aggression on his dominions, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid His Highness to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided His Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."

Inclosure in Sir  
L. Mallet's to  
Mr. Currie,  
April.

Among the "rumours afloat" was one to the effect that a preliminary convention between Russia and Persia "extended the

Russian frontier midway between Sarakhs and Merv," but Mr. Thomson called it "premature"; and on the Ameer of Afghanistan inquiring of the Viceroy of India what his own boundaries were to the north and west, Lord Ripon advised him "that they had been settled by the British Government with Russia in 1873, when the Afghan territory between the Oxus and the Heri Rud was defined as containing Akcha, Siripool, Maimena, Shiberghan, and Andkhoi, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turkomans"; but it was at the same time acknowledged that "this boundary has never been laid down accurately on any map, and the country has not been examined on the spot with that view."

Lord Granville  
to Mr. Thomson,  
July 17.  
Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
July 19.

Inclosure in Sir  
L. Mallet's to  
Mr. Currie,  
Aug. 17.

*Ibid.*

About the same time the Russian Minister at Teheran was urging on our Minister there the necessity "of removing an important element of discord, by having the demarcation of the Afghan line of frontier from Khojah

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
Aug. 4, 1883.

Saleh to the Heri Rud agreed upon and speedily effected," and Mr. Condie Stephen was cleverly pointing out inexactitudes of latitudes of places marked on the latest Russian maps, which placed towns such as Sarakhs so much more to the north as to make it more difficult for Persia to claim them in the delimitation commission then proceeding.

Memo. by Mr.  
Stephen, Sept.  
5, 1883.

Mr. Stephen's remark about Sarakhs elicited from M. Zinovieff at St. Petersburg, who had been Russian Minister in Persia, the statement that "Sarakhs, being a Persian fortress, would always lie outside of any Russian line of frontier"; but special attention on Sarakhs and Merv was now being called to the fore, sometimes in the despatches to and from Teheran, where Eyoub Khan resided as refugee, and who, since the arrival of the Russian Boundary Commissioners, insisted on "going to Bokhara, by Sarakhs and Merv," and was not allowed to proceed by the Shah, as "this would be regarded by

Mr. Kennedy to  
Lord Granville,  
Sept. 27, 1883.

Mr. Thomson to  
Lord Granville,  
Nov. 22.

Her Majesty's Government as a very unfriendly act"; at others by the complaints of M. Lessar from Merv as to the "encouragement of marauders by the presence of Mr. O'Donovan in Merv"; and again by statements of the inability of the Persians to cope with the Turkoman raiders in Khorasan, the Shah "having earnestly begged the Russian authorities to take vigorous measures for the prevention of future raids." This request was at once met by "instructions given to the Commander of the forces at Askabad to do his best to meet the wishes of the Persian Government," and these instructions no doubt accounted for the presence of "a Russian force in the Atek of Dereghy on the way to the Tejend."

The significance of this force was soon apparent in the report which reached the Foreign Office, "that the Merv chiefs had submitted to Russian rule," and the confirmation of the news in Sir Edward Thornton's telegram, "His Imperial Majesty

Lord Granville  
to Mr. Thomson,  
Nov. 24.

Inclosure in Sir  
E. Thornton's,  
Nov. 27, 1883.

Sir Ed. Thornton to Lord  
Granville,  
Oct. 24.

*Ibid.*, Jan. 2,  
1884.


Lord Granville  
to Mr. Thomson,  
Feb. 9.

has determined to accept the allegiance which the representatives of the Merv Turkomans had sworn at Askabad, and to send an officer to administer the Government of that region."

Sir E. Thornton  
to Lord Gran-  
ville, Feb. 15.

Here ends the last published Blue-book on Central Asia, but Sarakhs is Russian now, as is indeed much of the convenient road to Herat pointed out by M. Lessar, that pioneer of Russia's ever-progressive, if not aggressive, advance towards India.





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